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Introduction 
When discussing the realities of the future of our planet, it is imperative to consider what 
weapons the conflicts of the future may be waged with. While man has long fought on land, sea, 
and sky, future conflicts very well could be in space. 
Given the potential for space conflict, states have begun developing space for military 
purposes, requiring consideration on whether or not these operations should be permissible. The 
exploration of space will continue to occur; the question remains whether it will be a competition 
or a collaboration. The future of space is like all future endeavors: uncertain, and as such, the 
United States would do well to hedge its bets and be prepared to embrace both, through a 
combination of competition and cooperation to better its situation among the stars. 
  The first question to ask when considering this endeavor of exploration is whether an 
arms race in space would be anticipated or desired. This is completely conditional upon the 
actors that can initiate it, and by most indications, the current U.S. administration intends to do 
so. The Trump administration has not only created a new Space Force but has declared there to 
be a new space race. The administration has also recently withdrawn from the Open Skies 
Treaty: a treaty that would best be bypassed through the utilization of reconnaissance satellite 
platforms in space, as it pertains to the overflight of reconnaissance aircraft.1 Of course, while 
Trump’s doctrine will direct American policy for the near future, the potential for a space race 
will also be heavily guided by the actions of other nations. This primarily includes China as a top 
competitor due to its technological advancements and current role within the Sino-American 
great power competition.2 Within the United States, debates continue between those who follow 
brown water doctrine–that space power ought to focus on the potential for warfare and general 
order in outer space–and blue water doctrine–that space power ought to focus on supporting the 
commercial use of space.3 This is allowed and encouraged by the SPACE Act of 2015, which 
allows for commercial exploitation of space by Americans.4 These doctrines primarily compete 
with one that supports a more cooperative space with global involvement, but the doctrine that 
will prevail remains uncertain.  
Competition 
While the future of space is far from certain, there are benefits to investing into a modern-
day space race. America can benefit strategically from more advanced technological innovation 
in a shorter period of time; from upgraded offensive and defensive military capabilities, and a 
climate more suitable for strengthening the United States' relationship with its allies.  
 
1
 Jim Garamone, “Trump Signs Law Establishing U.S. Space Force,” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 
December 20, 2019,  
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2046035/trump-signs-law-establishing-usspace-
force/.; Mike Wall, “US Is in a New Space Race with China and Russia, VP Pence Says,” Space.com, Space, March 
27, 2019, https://www.space.com/new-space-race-moon-mike-pence-says.html.; “The Open Skies Treaty at a 
Glance,” Arms Control Association, May 2020, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/openskies.  
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 Elbridge A. Colby and A. Wess Mitchell, “The Age of Great-Power Competition,” Foreign Affairs, 
December 10, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-12-10/agegreat-power-competition.  
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When examining a future space race, it is critical to examine the nature of the United 
States’ prior military competition. On Earth's surface, the Cold War was a battle of power by 
means of nuclear proliferation, espionage, and proxy wars. Above the stratosphere, the Space 
Race was a challenge of scientific innovation. While tensions remained relatively high between 
Cold War superpowers on the ground, the Space Race was much more competition than direct 
conflict. This competition created a back-and-forth that pushed the United States to increase its 
technological capabilities in order to stay ahead.5 Whether through the Strategic Defense 
Initiative, better known as Star Wars, or through anti-satellite (ASAT) tests of the 80s, the U.S. 
has striven to maintain an edge.6 This concept can translate into a contemporary space race as 
well. More and more nations are capable of the technology of space travel than ever before, 
allowing for a larger pool from which advancements can come from and in which competition 
can occur. In a modern age where the ability of private companies in the space technology 
market is comparable to, if not greater than, the state-run space programs, this is even more 
apparent. These improvements not only mean better technology for government-run or funded 
programs, but also better-performing, faster, lighter, and more compact technology in non-outer 
space technology, due to the trickle-down effect of technology from the defense sector to the 
private sector. The commercial competition also allows for innovation of technology that would 
not have otherwise been created like ARPANET.7 
This competition did not end with the Cold War however, as even the Obama 
administration classified space strategy as contested, competitive, and congested, commonly 
referred to as the three C’s. The trend of the past decade is a contested space filled with many 
more space capable nations, increasing the congestion above the atmosphere and the stakes of an 
ever-expanding space competition, or race. This take had a heavy emphasis on the competition of 
space and has served the U.S. well in the past decade.8 
This competition brings more than just economic benefits, however; American military 
capabilities stand to benefit from a space race. However, despite its current importance, policy 
makers are paying little regard to space policy. While the recent formation of the Space Force 
has made strides toward making space more of a priority, the branch lacks the structure and 
funding necessary to achieve its important goals of maintaining a leading role in space.9 A space 
race could provide the necessary motivation on the part of policymakers to increase funding and 
 
5
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Essays, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2016,  
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subsequently increase the capability of the Space Force. It is easy to see how a space race would 
push forward military offensive capabilities, but most importantly, it would also aid the United 
States’ defensive capabilities. This would mean better protection of U.S. satellites, which play an 
important role in national security on the ground including communications, missile warning 
systems, imagery surveillance, the GPS system, and weather monitoring, among other 
capabilities.10  
Other nations are surging forward in a quest to develop satellite killing technology to 
close the gap to U.S. superiority with ASAT weapons. Russia has been pursuing recent ASAT 
capabilities, including an airborne laser system able to target missile defense systems. China has 
been training military units to utilize its ASAT missile systems, capable of attacking LEO (low 
earth orbit) satellites.11 India has even tested its own kinetic kill vehicle last year, and is now 
capable of producing more of the weapons that can take down satellites up to 1000 km above 
Earth.12 Currently, the only kinetic capability for anti-LEO satellites that America possesses is 
repurposing the AEGIS system intended to intercept ballistic missiles, which was tested in 2008 
against a U.S. satellite.13 Without significant investment in satellite defense programs or better 
purpose built ASAT programs for deterrence, the United States will not be adequately prepared 
to tackle space. 
Aside from improved technological capabilities, a space race would provide an ideal 
climate for creating tighter diplomatic relations with American allies. While one could argue that 
such an arms race would destroy any hope at global space cooperation, such a belief is 
unfounded. Like it or not, competition in space has already begun and is unlikely to reduce in 
any capacity as more contenders vie for more control. Currently, there are rising threats in space 
from the Chinese and Russian governments that would be magnified through a space race. In 
light of this, American allies would not only be willing to increase partnership with U.S. space 
defense efforts, but also be willing to help enhance combined capabilities. Currently, the U.S.-led 
Combined Space Operations Center currently works with close allies of Australia, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany, and New Zealand, as well as cooperation with other NATO 
allies. This cooperation can only increase with a larger and more rapidly increasing threat. While 
space partnerships are already more developed between America and the other Five Eyes 
nations–Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand–the U.S. can benefit by 
developing its ties with other potential allies, such as the growing space power of India. India has 
developed ASAT capabilities and already established itself as a space rival to China, making it a 
prime candidate for partnership to combat Chinese aggression in space.14 Japan is another nation 
whose existing partnerships with the United States, coupled with its existing space programs, can 
 
10
 Ibid.  
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help to counter Chinese advances.15 These relationships in space can also have the effect of 
increasing cooperation on Earth, as well as increasing the United States’ world standing.  
 
Cooperation 
While there are certainly positive aspects to a second space race, there are a plethora of 
detractors as well. In all facets of geopolitical considerations, a space race could adversely affect 
the United States by increasing tensions in the growing Great Power Conflict, costing exorbitant 
amounts of capital; and most crucially it may not be a race that the United States can win.  
There is a new era of great power competition sweeping over Earth.16 With an 
increasingly belligerent Russia, a China with hegemonic aspirations, and nuclear proliferation by 
a number of less stable regimes, the world is an increasingly volatile place to carry out 
geopolitics. By starting a new arms race, not to mention one in a virtually unexplored domain, 
one could hardly expect this volatility to decrease. During the Cold War nuclear arms and first 
space race the world was under constant fear of a nuclear holocaust. By stoking the fears of 
autocratic rivals in Russia and China that expect aggression from the U.S., the United States 
would play increasingly into the hands of its adversaries by kicking off an arms race in space, 
losing a credible claim to peacebuilding among allies and concerned third parties alike. Space 
will very likely be weaponized at some point, however that does not necessitate a mad rush with 
little concern for the environment, stability, and world peace in the process. Diplomatically 
speaking, an arms race would be detrimental to U.S. credibility and would unnecessarily provoke 
American adversaries.  
The financial costs of a space race would be staggering, a sum that an already 
overextended U.S. budget could ill afford to handle. By adding an additional domain to fund that 
would dwarf air, sea, land, and cyber costs by countless zeros, it would add insult to injury on the 
financial status of the country. Admittedly, the financial costs of the two races in the past were 
not without benefits, with technology spanning a wide range of fields, including LEDs, memory 
foam, and countless other innovations being developed through the funding of space exploration, 
tech that may have never been developed otherwise.17 In the present moment, however, with 
much of advanced dual-use technology being fulfilled by private ventures, a new space race 
funded by taxpayers may not be necessary to accomplish technological innovation.18 Even if an 
arms race is the only catalyst for progress and innovation, is it worth the potential conflict?  
Finally, the last reason, and by far the most pertinent, is the fact that this arms race may 
not be one the United States can win. China is a leading space power, one of only three countries 
to place a man in space, and its massive state-run economy can subsidize space weaponization 
 
15
 Todd Harrison et al., “SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 - Aerospace Security,” Aerospace 
Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 27, 2020, https://aerospace.csis.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/Harrison_SpaceThreatAssessment20_WEB_FINAL-min.pdf, 51. 
16
 Elbridge A. Colby and A. Wess Mitchell, “The Age of Great-Power Competition,” Foreign Affairs, 
December 10, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-12-10/agegreat-power-competition.  
17
 “NASA Technologies Benefit Our Lives,” NASA, accessed May 21, 2020, 
https://spinoff.nasa.gov/Spinoff2008/tech_benefits.html. 
18
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Foreign Relations, September 10, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/space-exploration-and-us-
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with consummate ease compared to America’s buckling financial burden.19 By committing to 
this race, the United States may very well be serving the same function that the Soviet Union did 
with the space race and arms race, that of a slowly declining power being bled of what financial 
capacity it had en route to a long term collapse. If the United States commits to this race, not 
only could it very conceivably lose, but it might just ruin its status as a superpower for decades 
or even centuries to come. By overemphasizing the Obama era three C’s doctrine of competition, 
stated in an age where America had an unquestionable “overall edge in space capabilities” it is 
easy to lose sight of the merits of cooperation. American technology is, for now, still the best in 
the business, and to ensure this, safeguards must be put in place to disincentivize weaponization 
in space, taking away the belligerent nations’ advantage.   
Conclusion 
One possible safeguard to prevent an arms race for space would be more treaties like the 
Outer Space Treaty (1967) or the proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS) 
resolution currently in the U.N.20 While historically these treaties have been opposed by the 
United States and ardently pursued by nations such as Russia and China (who feared the United 
States gaining a distinct advantage on future battlefield), the United States should look to these 
treaties as an effort to stave off future concerns of the same variety. Barring a cataclysmic shift, 
there is a very good possibility that the future of space belongs to China, as mentioned before.21 
With this possibility, it would behoove the United States to either massively ramp up funding to 
stay ahead of these adversaries (which is impossible) or try to mitigate its advantage by seeking 
to disarm space permanently, as a way to use American terrestrial military advantage. With 
stricter international constraints being placed on space, it can be left for science and commerce to 
seek the betterment of mankind. Potentially there will be an additional space race to colonize 
Mars or mine the Moon, but it will not be one of exorbitant defense spending in order to maintain 
an advantage on Earth. 
Irrespective of the results, America’s response to the space challenge of the next years 
and decades will chart the course of the United States for the foreseeable future. While the 
Obama administration had their three C’s, there are three new C’s to define the correct approach 
to space: Combining Competition and Cooperation. The decision today to pursue space as a field 
of cooperation, seeking mining of the Moon, colonization of Mars, and other feats as a global 
endeavor, or to see space as the next battlefield between China and other great powers, will 
certainly influence policy for years to come. By seeking a course of consolidation, pursuing 
cooperation where possible and competition where advantageous, America can both ensure its 
place on the world stage and remain a paragon of science in the 21st century. 
 
19
 Alexander Bowe, “China’s Pursuit of Space Power Status and Implications for the United States,” 
Washington D.C.: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, April 11, 2019, 
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC_China's%20Space%20Power%20 Goals.pdf), 2. 
20
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Defense University Press, July 1, 2014, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-
Quarterly74/Article/577537/defining-and-regulating-the-weaponization-of-space/; “Proposed Prevention of an Arms 
Race in Space (PAROS) Treaty,” Nuclear Threat Initiative - Ten Years of Building a Safer World, accessed May 21, 
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